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Every day a piece of computer code is sent to me by e-mail from a website to which I subscribe called 
IFTTT. Those letters stand for the phrase “if this then that,” and the code is in the form of a “recipe” 
that has the power to animate it. Recently, for instance, I chose to enable an IFTTT recipe that read, “if 
the temperature in my house falls below 45 degrees Fahrenheit, then send me a text message.” It’s a 
simple command that heralds a significant change in how we will be living our lives when much of the 
material world is connected—like my thermostat—to the Internet. 
 
Sue Halpern, 20142 
 
Since the present futures co-determine the future present, predictions basically enlarge the probability 
space we face; they do not reduce but expand both uncertainty and possibility. The question is about 
the distribution of the uncertainty and the possibility: who gets how much of what? 
 




Two Types of Algorithmic Governance 
IFTTT stands for ‘if this than that’ (Halpern 2014). IFTTT is how computers ‘think’. It suggests that 
computers can only run like closed systems that are deterministic by definition. Nevertheless, due to 
their processing power, connectivity, and our inventiveness, computing systems have now reached 
unprecedented levels of complexity, generating previously unforeseen levels of indeterminacy. It turns 
out that a recursive series of deterministic instructions (IFTTT) is capable of producing emergent 
behaviours that surprise even those who wrote the initial recipes (an algorithm, ultimately, is nothing 
more or less than a rather precise recipe or set of instructions). This is the result of advances in a sub 
discipline of artificial intelligence, called ‘machine learning’ (ML). We should, however, not mistake 
deterministic computing systems that follow clear and simple rules to provide automation of well-
defined tasks (IFTTT), for systems that reconfigure their own behaviours to autonomically improve 
their performance (ML). There is flexibility, a recursiveness and an unpredictability in ML that is 
absent in ‘dumb’ IFTTTs. The term ‘dumb’ here is not meant in a pejorative sense; it merely refers to 
non-learning algorithms that do not adapt their own IFTTTs on the basis of their ‘experience’, though 
they may adapt their behaviour, based on their IFTTTs. A simple thermostat runs on a ‘dumb’ 
algorithm: its IFTTT determines that whenever the temperature drops below (or above) a certain 
degree the heating or air conditioner will be turned on – until that same temperature is reached. A 
smart energy grid will require a continuous learning process, to calibrate energy demand and (local 
and centralised) energy supply in a way that enables load balancing as well as energy efficiency. As I 
hope to clarify, ‘dumb’ can be smart as far as dependence on computing systems is concerned. 
 In this essay I will suggest that ‘dumb’ IFTTTs and ML can each have added value as well as 
drawbacks, depending on how they are used for what purpose. On the one hand, automated decision 
systems in public administration may, for instance, have the added value of being predictable while 
sustaining accountability, precisely because they are ‘dumb’ (they do not learn, they just do as 
instructed). The drawback will probably be that automated decisions are rigid and may be flawed 
because only a limited set of data points is taken into account. On the other hand, autonomic decision 
support systems for medical diagnosis may, for instance, have the added value of coming up with 
                                                      
1 An imbroglio has been defined as ‘a confused mass; an intricate or complicated situation (as in a drama or 
novel); an acutely painful or embarrassing misunderstanding’, cf. ‘Imbroglio’ Merriam-Webster.com, Merriam-
Webster, accessed 2 August 2016. In this essay the concept is used as a reference to the complex entanglement 
of deterministic and learning algorithms that (in)form our increasingly data-driven environment.  
2 See also https://ifttt.com. 
unforeseen correlations between previously unrelated data points, precisely because such systems 
improve their performance due to recurrent feedback cycles. Here the drawback may be that the 
system is not transparent (its inner operations are black boxed) and its output cannot be explained, 
other than referring to often-irretrievable statistics. I believe that a discussion that turns on whether 
one is for or against algorithmic governance in general would ignore the difference between two types 
of algorithms and thereby obfuscate what is at stake. Instead, the discussion about algorithms should 
focus on the type of problems that benefit from either strict application of ‘dumb’ algorithms or from 
adaptive algorithms that are not entirely predictable.  
 This being said, the question of when to use what algorithms is neither a purely technical 
question (if there is such a thing) nor a purely political one (if there were such a thing).3 The decision 
to engage either ‘dumb’ IFTTTs or ML may have far reaching consequences for those subjected to the 
outcome of algorithmic machines, which turns it into a political question. Even if the outcome is 
checked or applied by a human person, the impact of algorithmic governance is momentous, because 
that person may not be capable of explaining the outcome and she may have no competence to amend 
it. If democracy is about self-government we need to find ways and means to involve those affected by 
algorithmic governance in the choices that must be made.4 Democratically informed decisions on what 
algorithms to use will therefore require public understanding of how their employment is constraint by 
what is possible and feasible in computational terms.5 This may sound like an insurmountable 
challenge, but it is not unlike the challenge of alphabetising an entire population, which ultimately 
enabled self-government since the era of the printing press. On top of that, the political question 
depends on coming to terms with the distribution of beneficial and adverse effects amongst citizens, 
commercial and governmental players. It may be that a small set of players benefits, whereas others 
pay the costs. To chart such effects, we need to understand the difference between automation (‘dumb’ 
IFTTTs) and autonomics (ML). As to the latter, I will suggest that the distribution of benefits and 
costs is contingent on the distribution of the uncertainty that is created by predictive and pre-emptive 
analytics. Though one may intuitively assume that predictions reduce uncertainty, this is agent-
dependent. Those with access to the predictions have additional reasons to change course, whereas 
those who remain in the dark are confronted with decisions they could not have foreseen.  
 Finally, this brief essay will draw the line between, on the one hand, legal certainty and, on the 
other hand, both arbitrary decision-making and rigid application of inflexible rules. The Rule of Law 
aims to create an institutional environment that enables us to foresee the legal effect of what we do, 
while further instituting our agency by stipulating that such effect is contestable in a court of law – 
also against big players.6 Such a – procedural – conception of the Rule of Law implies that both 
automation and autonomics should be constraint in ways that open them up to scrutiny and render 
their computational judgements liable to being nullified as a result of legal proceedings. This will not 
solve all of the problems created by algorithmic governance. It should, nevertheless, create the level 
playing field needed to partake in the construction of the choice architectures that determine both 
individual freedom and ‘the making of’ the public good.7 
 
Automation and Autonomics in an Onlife World 
                                                      
3 On the relationship between technology, morality, political issues and law: Chapter 7 and 8 in Hildebrandt  
2015a. 
4 Cf. Hildebrandt and Gutwirth 2007, where we discriminate between aggregate, deliberative and participatory 
democratic practices. Instead of discussing these practices in terms of either/or we propose that each has an 
important role to play. On participatory democratic theory see notably Dewey (1927) and the excellent analysis 
of Marres (2005). Democratic participation does not assume that consensus can be reached, but vouches that 
those who suffer the consequences of a policy must be involved, cf. Mouffe (2000), who speaks of agonistic 
debate as a precondition for sound democratic decision making. 
5 Cf. Wynne 1995. 
6 I agree with Waldron (2008) that the core of the Rule of Law depends on an effective right to see to it that 
justice is done, by appealing to an independent court that has authority to decide the applicable interpretation of 
the law.  
7 The concept of a ‘choice architecture’ refers to the type of choices one can and cannot make and the default 
settings that favour specific options, taking note that most choices are made implicitly, based on heuristics rather 
than rational deliberation. See Thaler and Sunstein 2008, and – more interesting - Gigerenzer 2000. 
The idea of an ‘onlife’ world was initiated by Floridi and taken up by a group of philosophers, social 
scientists, neuroscientists, and computer scientists who wrote the Onlife Manifesto, on ‘being human 
in a hyperconnected era’.8 The original idea was to signal the conflation of online and offline, as this 
distinction is becoming increasingly artificial. In my book on Smart Technologies and the End(s) of 
Law,9 I have further developed the notion of an onlife world, suggesting that autonomic computing 
systems develop a specific kind of mindless agency that animates our new ‘social’ environment. The 
onlife world is not merely a matter of turning everything online but also a matter of things seemingly 
coming alive. This relates to the difference between automation and autonomics.10  
 Since the advent of the steam engine and electricity we are familiar with the automation of 
menial tasks, delegating physical labour to machines, either because of their enhanced ‘horse power’ 
or because of their ability to endlessly and rapidly repeat specific tasks.11 Currently, however, a new 
type of automation has developed, automating cognitive tasks that require autonomic behaviour.12 
Mere repetition will not do here, as autonomic systems must be capable of reconfiguring their own 
rules when responding to changes in the environment.13 Though both automation and autonomics 
operate on the basis of algorithms, the first are static whereas the second are adaptive, dynamic, and 
more or less transformative. Though both can be black boxed by whoever employs them,14 algorithms 
that generate machine learning are inherently opaque – even for those who develop and employ them. 
This is evident when the system runs on deep learning multi-level artificial neural networks that 
conduct unsupervised learning, but even in other cases there is no easy way to explain why the 
algorithms decided as they did. Machine learning is an inductive process, its output is liable to 
inductive bias (bias in the data as well as bias in the algorithms) and its usage is liable to various types 
of inductive fallacies (e.g. mistaking the outcome for the truth, or deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’). 
This entails that, as with inductive science, we need certain scepticism as to the extrapolation of 
patterns detected in the observed data (called the training set in ML) to similar patterns in new data 
(called the test set in ML). Not only because these new data may contain a black swan, but also 
because we could probably have used other patterns to describe the initial data points and these other 
patterns may turn out to better fit with the mechanisms that determine both the training and the test 
set.15  
 In other words, the temporality of our being rules out that either human or machine learning is 
infallible. ML does not reduce uncertainty but extends it by adding new predictions that will trigger 
new responses that in turn call for updated predictions.16 Moreover, a prediction is a ‘present future’ 
that influences the ‘future present’ because actors will change their behaviour based on such a 
prediction.17 ML, based on predictive analytics, will therefore create new uncertainties, since we do 
not know how actors will respond to the new range of ‘present futures’.18 To the extent that the 
capability to anticipate uncertainty is a crucial characteristic of living organisms, ML can indeed be 
said to turn our machine environment onlife. We may even come to a point where ‘dumb’ algorithms 
will come to the rescue, consolidating and stabilising cascading uncertainties by simply acting as 
stipulated, behaving as coded, contributing to a reasonable level of predictability.  
 It is not that simple, of course. If the onlife world is an imbroglio of ‘dumb’ as well as smart 
algorithmic governance, the question will be when to endorse either one and how to foresee their 
interoperability (or, the lack thereof). As to the frustrations generated by automation let me provide a 
topical example. Imagine entering the Leiden Railway Station during maintenance work on the 
tourniquets, so it is not possible to check-in with your public transport chip card. Those at work 
                                                      
8 Floridi 2014. I was part of the Onlife Initiative, see <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/onlife-
original-outcome>. 
9 Hildebrandt 2015a. 
10 Hildebrandt 2011. 
11 See Latour (2000) on delegation to technologies. 
12 Chess, Palmer, and White 2003, Hildebrandt and Rouvroy 2011. 
13 Steels 1995. 
14 Pasquale 2015. 
15 Mitchell 2006, Wolpert 2016. 
16 Gabor 1963. 
17 Esposito 2011. 
18 Hildebrandt 2016. 
suggest you can just go through without checking in. At the next station, when checking out, you are 
automatically fined for traveling without having checked-in. When calling the help-desk the lady 
ensures you that this is no problem because you will get your money back. However, she ends the 
conversation with a warning: you can only get your money back three times per year – after that you 
will have to pay. Trying to explain to her that this was not your mistake does not ring any bells with 
her; she is just repeating the rules.19 Note that ‘dumb’ IFTTTs cannot adjust their own rules based on 
feedback, which also means that any wrong input will cascade through the system (errors are also 
automated). Smart systems may be more flexible and improve their performance based on recurrent 
feedback loops. The question remains, however, who determines the performance metric in the light of 
what goals. Moreover, as indicated above, the opacity of ML systems may reduce both the 
accountability of their ‘owners’ and the contestability of their decisions.20  
 
The Political, the Technical, and the Legal 
The question of when to employ what type of algorithms is both a political and a technical question. 
At some point it should also be a legal question, because under the Rule of Law individuals should 
have effective means to challenge decisions that violate their rights and freedoms. Lawyers call this 
the right to effective remedies to uphold one’s fundamental rights (e.g. codified in art. 13 European 
Convention of Human Rights). Algorithmic governance easily implies that one is not aware of how 
decisions have been prepared, moulded or even executed in the intestines of various computational 
systems. Autonomic computing systems, however, enable the profiling, categorising and targeting as 
citizens or consumers in terms of high or low risk for health, credit, profitable employment, failure to 
pass a grade in one’s educational institution, for tax and social security fraud, for criminal or terrorist 
inclinations, and in terms of access to buildings, social security, countries or medical assistance. Such 
personalised targeting will determine what cognitive psychologists and behavioural economists call 
‘the choice architecture’ that decides which options individuals have, and whether and how these 
options are brought to the attention of the ‘user’.21 It enables subliminal influencing of individual 
people, based on techniques like AB research-designs that trace and track how we respond to different 
interfaces, approaches, and options.22 To the extent that ‘dumb’ algorithms rely on the input generated 
by ML the problems they generate are expounded. This results in an imbroglio of invisibly biased 
decision systems that mediate our access to the world (search engines, online social networks, smart 
energy grids and the more), potentially creating unprecedented uncertainty about how our machine-led 
environment will interpret and sanction our behaviours.  
 
Such gloomy prophecies need not, however, come true. We have struggled against the arbitrary rule of 
dictators as well as the power of private actors capable of twisting our hand. We have developed ways 
and means to protect human dignity and individual liberty, achieving the kind of legal certainty that 
safeguards both the predictability and trustworthiness of our social and institutional environment and 
its open texture in the face of legitimate argumentation.23 The point is that we cannot take for granted 
that remedies that worked in the era of printing press, steam engine, and electricity will necessarily 
protect us in an onlife world. This will require rethinking as well as reinventing the Rule of Law, for 
instance by making the intestines of the emerging imbroglio transparent and by making its decisions 
contestable. In recent articles the so-called right to profile transparency of the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation has been heralded for its spot-on approach to ML algorithms.24 This right means 
that automated decisions (whether based on dumb or smart algorithms) that significantly affect people, 
trigger the fundamental right to data protection. More specifically, such decisions ‘automatically’ 
                                                      
19 The example modulates a similar experience of colleagues Aernout Schmidt and Gerrit-Jan Zwenne, as 
recounted during the Annual Meeting of the Netherlands Lawyers Association, 10th June 2016.  
20 For attempts to chart the legal issues of automated and autonomic bureaucratic decision making, see Citron 
2007 and Citron and Pasquale 2014. 
21 Thaler, Sunstein and Balz 2010. 
22 This also regards attempts to influence voting, e.g. Christian and Griffiths 2016, explaining AB research-
design and its usage in the US presidential elections. On the capacity to influence voting by merely tweaking a 
search algorithm see Epstein and Robertson 2015. 
23 Waldron 2011. See also, arguing for legality and against legalism Hildebrandt 2015b. 
24 E.g. Goodman and Flaxman 2016, cf. Hildebrandt 2012. 
generate two obligations and one right: first, people must be told about the existence of automated 
decisions, second, they must be given meaningful access to the logic of such decision, and, third, those 
concerned have a right to object against being subject to such decisions. It is interesting to note that 
the right to profile transparency is framed – by some - as a clash between US based AI companies and 
the EU, or even between innovation and Luddite hesitation.25 I believe that such labels are out-dated 
and stand in the way of global progress. Progress involves hesitation as well as innovation, high risk 
and high gain, but not at the cost of those already disadvantaged, or vulnerable to data-driven 
exclusion. At some point any individual person faced with the onlife imbroglio - that we are already a 
part of – may be disadvantaged by and vulnerable to unfair and degrading treatment by interacting 
automated and autonomic computing systems.   
 Profile transparency implies that the uncertainty generated by ML should be contained, to 
prevent mishaps. It also implies that decisions that seriously affect individuals’ capabilities must be 
constructed in ways that are comprehensible as well as contestable.26 If that is not possible, or, as long 
as this is not possible, such decisions are unlawful. In that case we may have to employ dumb 
algorithms, though even the outcome of dumb algorithms must be comprehensible and contestable. As 
to ML, we need to invest in the engineering of choice architectures that re-instates our agency instead 
of manipulating it. This is not about ‘the more choice the better’.27 It can only be about involving those 
whose onlife is at stake in the construction of the choice architectures that will define their capabilities 




                                                      
25 E.g. Metz 2016. 
26 My use of the term capability in inspired by Sen (2004), where the capability is the substance that is to be 
protected, while the right itself co-constitutes the capability by safeguarding its sustainability.   
27 Van den Berg 2016. 
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